The RSA has angrily denied a claim that it secretly took $10 million from the NSA to use the buggered up Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generator in its encryption products.
RSA, which is owned by EMC, started using Dual EC DRBG by default in 2004, before the generator was standardised.
In 2007 a backdoor in the algorithm weakened the strength of any encryption that relied on it. It was only in September 2013, RSA told its customers to stop using the algorithm.
The NSA is also accused of weakening the random number generator during its development.
However written in its blog, shown below, the RSA said that it categorically denied the allegation that it knew Dual EC DRBG was “flawed” when it started using the algorithm.
Recent press coverage has asserted that RSA entered into a “secret contract” with the NSA to incorporate a known flawed random number generator into its BSAFE encryption libraries. We categorically deny this allegation.
We have worked with the NSA, both as a vendor and an active member of the security community. We have never kept this relationship a secret and in fact have openly publicized it. Our explicit goal has always been to strengthen commercial and government security.
Key points about our use of Dual EC DRBG in BSAFE are as follows:
- We made the decision to use Dual EC DRBG as the default in BSAFE toolkits in 2004, in the context of an industry-wide effort to develop newer, stronger methods of encryption. At that time, the NSA had a trusted role in the community-wide effort to strengthen, not weaken, encryption.
- This algorithm is only one of multiple choices available within BSAFE toolkits, and users have always been free to choose whichever one best suits their needs.
- We continued using the algorithm as an option within BSAFE toolkits as it gained acceptance as a NIST standard and because of its value in FIPS compliance. When concern surfaced around the algorithm in 2007, we continued to rely upon NIST as the arbiter of that discussion.
- When NIST issued new guidance recommending no further use of this algorithm in September 2013, we adhered to that guidance, communicated that recommendation to customers and discussed the change openly in the media.
RSA, as a security company, never divulges details of customer engagements, but we also categorically state that we have never entered into any contract or engaged in any project with the intention of weakening RSA’s products, or introducing potential ‘backdoors’ into our products for anyone’s use.
It said it made sense to use the random number generator in the context of an industry-wide effort to develop newer, stronger methods of encryption.
At that time, the NSA had a trusted role in the community-wide effort to strengthen, not weaken, encryption.
The RSA used the algorithm as an option within BSAFE toolkits as it gained acceptance as a NIST standard and because of its value in FIPS compliance.
“When concern surfaced around the algorithm in 2007, we continued to rely upon NIST as the arbiter of that discussion,” the blog said.
And what about the $10 million figure which appeared in an Edward Snowden report? The RSA forgot to mention that. It just said that it had “never entered into any contract or engaged in any project with the intention of weakening RSA’s products”.
Source: TechEye
